Extortion

Economica

Volumn 65, Issue 260, 1998, Pages 461-477

  Konrad, Kai A ^a   Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; CRIME; PARALLEL ECONOMY;

EID: 0032461002     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00141     Document Type: Article

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