Political institutions and policy volatility

Economics and Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-27

  Henisz, Witold Jerzy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EXPENDITURE; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PRICE DYNAMICS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 1542377281     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00129.x     Document Type: Article

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