Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

Journal of Economic Growth

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 243-276

  Clague, Christopher ^a   Keefer, Philip ^b   Knack, Stephen ^c   Olson, Mancur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

^c AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Autocracy; Contract rights; Democracy; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542422445     PISSN: 13814338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00138864     Document Type: Article

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