The institutional environment for infrastructure investment

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 355-389

  Henisz, Witold J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INFRASTRUCTURE; INVESTMENT; INVESTMENT INCENTIVE;

EID: 0036232528     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/11.2.355     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. Institutional and competitive bandwagons: Using mathematical modeling as a tool to explore innovation diffusion
2. Convergence
3. Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable
4. Interfirm adoption of capital-goods innovations
5. Political institutions and electric utility investment: A cross-nation analysis
6. Political sources of growth: A critical note on measurement
7. Expected modes of policy change in comparative institutional settings
8. The macroeconomics of specificity
9. Government owned enterprises: Theory, performance and efficiency
10. Reopening the convergence debate: A new look at cross-country growth empirics
11. The politics of infrastructure
12. Infrastructure project finance and capital flows: A new perspective
13. Computer and dynamo: The modern productivity paradox in the not-too-distant mirror
14. Institutions, investment and growth: New cross-country and panel data evidence
15. Princes and merchants: European city growth before the industrial revolution
16. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially-dependent panel data
17. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity in financial data
18. Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations
19. Can the government be trusted to keep its part of a social contract New Jersey and the railways, 1825-1888
20. The institutional environment for economic growth
21. The institutional environment for telecommunications investment
22. Competitive diffusion
23. Protection against a capricious state: French investment and Spanish railroads, 1845-1875
24. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures
25. On the concept of optimal growth
26. A dynamic analysis of the adoption of a new technology
27. The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: A comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation
28. Contracts, intellectual property rights and multinational investments in developing countries
29. The political economy of stabilization: Commitment, capacity and public response
30. A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix
31. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England
32. Big bills left on the sidewalk: Why some nations are rich and others poor
33. The diffusion of innovation among steel firms: The basic oxygen furnace
34. The diffusion of technological innovation in the commercial banking industry
35. The diffusion of new technology and the market for an innovation
36. Interindustry and interfirm differences in the rate of diffusion of an innovation
37. Tying the king's hands: Credible commitment and royal fiscal policy during the old regime
38. The diffusion of new technologies: Evidence from the electric utility industry
39. Economic convergence and economic policies
40. Commitment and governance in infrastructure sectors
41. A positive theory of legislative intent
42. Reform of the core public sector: New Zealand experience
43. A contribution to the theory of economic growth
44. Agency discretion under judicial review
45. Institutions and regulatory commitment in utilities' privatization
46. Decision costs and strategic design of administrative process and judicial review
47. The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment in the UK (with special emphasis on telecommunication)
48. Adoption order of new technologies in evolving markets
49. Decision-making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism
50. Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis
51. Ownership and performance in competitive environments: A comparison of the performance of private, mixed and state-owned enterprises
52. Franchise bidding with respect to CATV and in general