Protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 22, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 953-987

  Asoni, Andrea ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic development; Institutions; Property rights

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC THEORY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; PROPERTY RIGHTS;

EID: 55949126220     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00554.x     Document Type: Article

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