Self-organization and emergence in social systems: Modeling the coevolution of social environments and cooperative behavior

Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Volumn 35, Issue 1-3, 2011, Pages 177-208

  Helbing, Dirk ^a   Yu, Wenjian ^a   Rauhut, Heiko ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Cooperation; Migration; Mobility; Representative agent models; Self organization and emergence; Social dilemmas; Social learning and imitation; Social networks; Spatial games

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551602080     PISSN: 0022250X     EISSN: 15455882     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2010.532258     Document Type: Article

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