Does ignorance promote norm compliance?

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-28

  Groeber, Patrick ^a   Rauhut, Heiko ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Control; Crime; Dark figure; Punishment; Self fulfilling prophecy; Social norms

Indexed keywords

DARK FIGURE; DETECTION PROBABILITIES; NORM VIOLATION; PUNISHMENT; SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY; SOCIAL NORM; THIRD PARTIES;

CONTROL; CRIME; MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

EID: 77955309941     PISSN: 1381298X     EISSN: 15729346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10588-009-9061-7     Document Type: Article

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