Punishment deters crime because humans are bounded in their strategic decision-making

JASSS

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2009, Pages

  Rauhut, Heiko ^a   Junker, Marcel ^b  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRÜCK   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agent Based simulation; Bounded rationality; Control; Crime; Experiment; Game theory; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349083507     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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