Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 737-770

  Dikolli, Shane S ^a   Kulp, Susan L ^b   Sedatole, Karen L ^c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Equity grants; Incentive contracts; Institutional ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 67650711685     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.737     Document Type: Article

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