Investor perceptions of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 48, Issue 2-3, 2009, Pages 172-189

  Fischer, Paul E ^a   Gramlich, Jeffrey D ^b,c   Miller, Brian P ^d   White, Hal D ^e  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE   (United States)

^c Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics   (Denmark)

^d INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate democracy; Corporate governance; Director elections; Performance measurement

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350408328     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.002     Document Type: Article

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