Action-Graph Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 141-173

  Jiang, Albert Xin ^a   Leyton Brown, Kevin ^a   Bhat, Navin A R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Computational techniques; Game representations; Graphical models; Large games; Nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650865112     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.012     Document Type: Article

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