An approach to bounded rationality

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 145-152

  Ben Sasson, Eli ^a   Kalai, Adam Tauman ^b   Kalai, Ehud ^c  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADDITIONAL COSTS; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS; MIN-MAX THEOREM; POTENTIAL GAMES; RATIONAL AGENTS; ZERO-SUM GAME;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GAME THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

COSTS;

EID: 57549083411     PISSN: 10495258     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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