New complexity results about Nash equilibria

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 621-641

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b  

^a Duke University   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649117928     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015     Document Type: Article

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