Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 28, Issue 7, 2004, Pages 1229-1241

  Govindan, Srihari ^a   Wilson, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithm; Equilibrium; Game; Homotopy; Polymatrix approximation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346361829     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00108-8     Document Type: Article

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