How bad is selfish routing?

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 236-259

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a,b   Tardos, Éva ^a,b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Braess's Paradox; Nash equilibria; Network flow; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

BRAESS'S PARADOX; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK FLOW; SELFISH ROUTING;

COMPUTER NETWORKS; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); EDGE DETECTION; OPTIMIZATION; PERFORMANCE; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

ROUTERS;

EID: 0038183237     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 00045411     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/506147.506153     Document Type: Article

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