Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 200-207

  Kearns, Michael ^a   Suri, Siddharth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary Stable Strategy; Game Theory; Networks

Indexed keywords

GRAPH THEORY; RANDOM PROCESSES;

EDGE DENSITY; EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY; RANDOMIZATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33748714104     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134729     Document Type: Conference Paper

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