Political selection and persistence of bad governments

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 125, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1511-1575

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Egorov, Georgy ^b   Sonin, Konstantin ^c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c New Economic School

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649823427     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1511     Document Type: Article

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