Optimal Retention in Agency Problems

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 293-323

  Banks, Jeffrey S ^a   Sundaram, Rangarajan K ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011913013     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2422     Document Type: Article

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