Voting on majority rules

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 115-132

  Messner, Matthias ^a   Polborn, Mattias K ^b  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL ECONOMY; REFORM PROCESS; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0842312525     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00278     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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