Alfred marshall lecture: Kleptocracy and dividend-rule: A model of personal rule

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 2, Issue 2-3, 2004, Pages 162-192

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Robinson, James A ^b   Verdier, Thierry ^c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c DELTA ENS ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957051942     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/154247604323067916     Document Type: Article

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