Exchange rate regimes and independent central banks: A correlated choice of imperfectly credible institutions

International Organization

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 411-442

  Bodea, Cristina ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958609532     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818310000111     Document Type: Article

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