Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 8, 1999, Pages 1569-1593

  Moser, Peter ^a,b  

^a Hochsch F Wirtsch Tourismus Chur   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Commitment; Monetary policy; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CENTRAL BANK; MONETARY POLICY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0032881677     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00045-2     Document Type: Article

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