Escaping the ties that bind: Exchange rate choice under central bank independence

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 40, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 808-831

  O'Mahony, Angela ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Exchange rate regime

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250183837     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414006291194     Document Type: Article

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