Government competence, economic performance and endogenous election dates

Electoral Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 2-3, 2000, Pages 413-426

  Palmer, Harvey D ^a   Whitten, Guy D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0034002530     PISSN: 02613794     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00059-1     Document Type: Conference Paper

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