The politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies

International Organization

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 291-324

  Leblang, David ^a   Bernhard, William ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034418463     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081800551181     Document Type: Review

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