On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 101-122

  Canavan, Chris ^a,b   Tommasi, Mariano ^c  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b Goldman Sachs Group   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Credibility; Exchange rate regime; Visibility

Indexed keywords

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY; FIXED EXCHANGE RATE; MODELLING APPROACH; NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE; STABILISATION;

EID: 0031394727     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(97)00031-X     Document Type: Article

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