Acquisition returns, increase in firm size, and chief executive officer compensation: The moderating role of monitoring

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 599-608

  Wright, Peter ^a   Kroll, Mark ^a   Elenkov, Detelin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036018696     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3069384     Document Type: Article

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