The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 45, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 1172-1182

  Pollock, Timothy G ^a   Fischer, Harald M ^a   Wade, James B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036959191     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3069432     Document Type: Article

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