Owners on both sides of the deal: Mergers and acquisitions and overlapping institutional ownership

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 31, Issue 10, 2010, Pages 1114-1135

  Goranova, Maria ^a   Dharwadkar, Ravi ^b   Brandes, Pamela ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

^b SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Institutional ownership; Mergers and acquisitions

Indexed keywords

AGENCY PROBLEMS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; SHAREHOLDER VALUES;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; SHAREHOLDERS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 77956945616     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.849     Document Type: Article

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