Truncation strategies in matching markets

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 327-335

  Ehlers, Lars ^a  

^a Université Laval   (Canada)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; Matching market; Truncation

Indexed keywords

LINEARIZATION; SCHOOL BUILDINGS;

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS; MATCHING MARKET; MEDICAL MARKETS; PROGRAMMING MECHANISMS; PUBLIC SCHOOLS; TRUNCATION; TRUNCATION STRATEGIES;

MARKETING;

EID: 61349172595     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1070.0294     Document Type: Article

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