Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 197-204

  Sönmez, Tayfun ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031281612     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2316     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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