On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 127, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 155-171

  Kesten, Onur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Acyclicity; Agent optimal stable mechanism; Indivisible goods; Top trading cycles mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33144458028     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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