Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 136, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 587-600

  Ehlers, Lars ^a   Massó, Jordi ^b  

^a Canada H3A 2T7   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; Matching market; Singleton core

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548025102     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. d'Aspremont C., and Peleg B. Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representation of committees. Soc. Choice Welfare 5 (1988) 261-280
2. D. Cantala, Matching markets: the particular case of couples, Mimeo, Universidad de Guanajuato, 2002.
3. S. Clark, Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching, Mimeo, University of Edinburgh, 2003.
4. Dubins L., and Freedman D. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Amer. Math. Monthly 88 (1981) 485-494
5. Dutta B., and Massó J. Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues. J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 464-475
6. Eeckhout J. On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings. Econ. Lett. 69 (2000) 1-8
7. L. Ehlers, In search of advice for physicians in entry-level medical markets, Mimeo, Université de Montréal, 2002.
8. Ehlers L. In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 249-270
9. Gale D., and Shapley L. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962) 9-15
10. Klaus B., and Klijn F. Stable matchings and preferences of married couples. J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75-106
11. B. Klaus, F. Klijn, J. Massó, Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask), Rev. Econ. Design, 2006, doi:10.1007/s10058-006-0017-9.
12. Knuth D. Marriages Stables, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal (1976), Montréal, Canada
13. D. Majumdar, Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible stable matchings, Mimeo, CORE, 2003.
14. Majumdar D., and Sen A. Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting rules. Econometrica 72 (2004) 523-540
15. Niederle M., and Roth A.E. Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: gastroenterology with and without a centralized match. J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 1342-1352
16. Roth A.E. The economics of matching: stability and incentives. Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982) 617-628
17. Roth A.E. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. J. Polit. Econ. 92 (1984) 991-1016
18. Roth A.E. Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 191-209
19. Roth A.E. The economist as engineer: game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70 (2002) 1341-1378
20. Roth A.E., and Peranson E. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design. Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748-780
21. Roth A.E., and Rothblum U. Truncation strategies in matching markets-in search of advice for participants. Econometrica 67 (1999) 21-43
22. A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1990 (Econometric Society Monograph).
23. Roth A.E., and Xing X. Jumping the gun: imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. Amer. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 992-1044
24. Sönmez T. Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets. J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 197-204
25. Sönmez T. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica 67 (1999) 677-689
26. Takamiya K. On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result. Soc. Choice Welfare 20 (2003) 77-83