Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 631-653

  Wehner, Joachim ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955015218     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01914.x     Document Type: Article

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