The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 635-665

  Warwick, Paul V ^a   Druckman, James N ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745475618     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00632.x     Document Type: Article

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