The political economy of the German Länder deficits: Weak governments meet strong finance ministers

Applied Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 19, 2011, Pages 2399-2415

  Jochimsen, Beate ^a   Nuscheler, Robert ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AUGSBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEBT; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; FISCAL POLICY; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY;

GERMANY;

EID: 79960724648     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: 14664283     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00036840903194246     Document Type: Article

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