Political denials: The policy effect of intercameral partisan differences in bicameral Parliamentary Systems

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 34-61

  Heller, William B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035594422     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/17.1.34     Document Type: Article

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