The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 17-42

  Druckman, James N ^a   Warwick, Paul V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13744257109     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00217.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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