Strategyproof classification with shared inputs

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 220-225

  Meir, Reshef ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING;

BINARY LABELS; DECISION MAKERS; DECISION-THEORETIC; PLAUSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; STRATEGY PROOFS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 77954736545     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (10)

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