Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 881-888

  Guo, Mingyu ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Payment free; Prior free

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ALLOCATION MECHANISM; COMPETITIVE MECHANISMS; COMPETITIVE RATIO; MECHANISM DESIGN; PAYMENT-FREE; PRIOR-FREE; STRATEGY PROOFS; VALUATION FUNCTION;

COSTS;

EID: 80054018118     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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