Truthful assignment without money

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 325-334

  Dughmi, Shaddin ^a   Ghosh, Arpita ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

mechanism design; truthfulness without money

Indexed keywords

BIPARTITE GRAPHS; BIPARTITE MATCHINGS; EDGE-SETS; GENERALIZED ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; LOGARITHMIC LOSS; MECHANISM DESIGN; NP-HARD; PRIVATE INFORMATION; PUBLIC INFORMATION; SELFISH AGENTS; STRATEGYPROOF MECHANISM; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GRAPH THEORY; OPTIMIZATION;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954812898     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807394     Document Type: Conference Paper

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