Transaction-cost economics: past, present, and future?

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 263-288

  Gibbons, Robert ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Boundary of the firm; Nobel; Oliver Williamson; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; FUTURE PROSPECT; TRANSACTION COST; VIEW;

EID: 77954167577     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01609.x     Document Type: Article

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