Markets and hierarchies and (mathematical) economic theory

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 561-595

  Kreps, David M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000511598     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/5.2.561     Document Type: Article

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