Inside organizations: Pricing, politics, and path dependence

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 337-365

  Gibbons, Robert ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Productivity differences; Relational contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954167582     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143304     Document Type: Article

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