Two's company, three's an equilibrium: Strategic voting and multicandidate elections

Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 251-278

  Patty, John W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 76349087801     PISSN: 15540626     EISSN: 15540634     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/100.00008056     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. James Adams, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results? British Journal of Political Science, 34(04):589-610, 2004.
2. John H. Aldrich. A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism. American Political Science Review, 77(4):974-990, 1983.
3. David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review, 90, 1996.
4. Jeff Banks, John Duggan, and Michel Le Breton. Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections. Journal of Economic Theory, 103:88-105, 2002.
5. Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan. Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-Motivated Candidates. In David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, editors, Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Springer, New York, NY, 2004.
6. Jeffrey S. Banks. Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control. Social Choice and Welfare, 1:295-306, 1985.
7. B. Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel Peleg, and Michael D. Whinston. Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria: I Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1):1-12, 1987.
8. Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 85-114, 1997.
9. Duncan Black. On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56: 23-34, 1948.
10. Duncan Black. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press., Cambridge, UK, 1958.
11. Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff. On 64% Majority Rule. Econometrica, 56(4):787-814, 1988.
12. Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff. Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem. Econometrica, 59(1):1-23, 1991a.
13. Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff. Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of equilibrium. Econometrica, 59:25-59, 1991b.
14. Thomas M. Carsey and Geoffrey C. Layman. A Dynamic Model of Political Change among Party Activists. Political Behavior, 21(1):17-41, 1999.
15. Giulio Codognatoy and Sayantan Ghosalz. On Existence of Undominated Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Nonatomic Games: A Generalization. International Journal of Game Theory, 31:493-498, 2003.
16. Peter J. Coughlin. Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
17. Peter J. Coughlin and Shmuel Nitzan. Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Maxima. Journal of Public Economics, 15:113-122, 1981a.
18. Peter J. Coughlin and Shmuel Nitzan. Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting. Journal of Economic Theory, 24:226-240, 1981b.
19. Gary W. Cox. Electoral Equilibria Under Alternative Voting Institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 31:82-108, 1987.
20. Gary W. Cox. Making Votes Count. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
21. David F. Damore. A Dynamic Model of Candidate Fundraising: The Case of Presidential Nomination Campaigns. Political Research Quarterly, 50(2):343-364, 1997.
22. Francesco De Sinopoli and Alessandro Turrini. A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy. 4(2):163-170, 2002.
23. Freancesco De Sinopoli. Sophisticated Voting and Equilibrium Refinements under Plurality Rule. Social Choice and Welfare, 17(4):655-672, 2000.
24. Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood. When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable? Games and Economic Behavior, 46(1):55-75, 2004.
25. Anthony Downs. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, New York, 1957.
26. John Duggan. Equilibrium Equivalence Under Expected Plurality and Probability of Winning Maximization. Mimeo, University of Rochester, 2000.
27. John Duggan and Mark Fey. Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2):490-522, 2005.
28. John Duggan and Matthew O. Jackson. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium and Deep Covering in Multidimensional Electoral Competition. Mimeo, University of Rochester, 2005.
29. Bhaskar Dutta and Jean-Francois Laslier. Comparison Functions and Choice Correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare, 16:513-532, 1999.
30. Robin Farquharson. The Theory of Voting. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1969.
31. Robert Forsythe, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz, and Robert J. Weber. An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories. Social Choice and Welfare, 10(3):223-247, 1993.
32. Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz, Roger Myerson, and Robert Weber. An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections. International Journal of Game Theory, 25 (3):355-383, 1996.
33. Andrew Gelman and Gary King. Why are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls so Variable When Votes are so Predictable? British Journal of Political Science, 23(1):409-451, 1993.
34. Melvin J. Hinich. Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact. Journal of Economic Theory, 16:208-219, 1977.
35. Harold Hotelling. Stability and Competition. Economic Journal, 39(1):41-57, 1929.
36. Matthew O. Jackson. Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 59(4):757-775, 1992.
37. Gerald H. Kramer. A Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 16: 310-334, 1977.
38. Gilbert Laffond, Jean-Francois Laslier, and Michel Le Breton. The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game. Games and Economic Behavior, 5:182-201, 1993.
39. Michel Le Breton and ShlomoWeber. On Existence of Undominated Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Nonatomic Games. Economics Letters, 56:171-175, 1997.
40. Tse-Min Lin, James Enelow, and Han Dorussen. Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Voting. Public Choice, 98:59-82, 1999.
41. Anthony J. McGann, William Koetzle, and Bernard Grofman. How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1):134-147, 2002.
42. Richard McKelvey. Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control. Journal of Economic Theory, 12:472-484, 1976.
43. Richard McKelvey and Norman Schofield. Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point. Econometrica, 55:923-933, 1987.
44. Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook. A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting. In J. Herndon and J. Bernd, editors, Mathematical Applications in Political Science VI, pages 32-78, Charlottesvilles, 1972. University Press of Virginia.
45. Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory, 36(1):55-85, 1985.
46. Richard D. McKelvey and John W. Patty. A Theory of Voting in Large Elections. Games and Economic Behavior, 57(1):155-180, 2006.
47. Gary Miller and Norman Schofield. Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States. American Political Science Review, 97(2):245-260, 2003.
48. Nicholas R. Miller. Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 21:769-803, 1977.
49. Nicholas R. Miller. Committees, Agendas, and Voting. Harwood Academic Publishers, London, 1995.
50. Roger Myerson and Robert Weber. A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political Science Review, 87:102-114, 1993.
51. Martin J. Osborne and Ashur Slivinsky. A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111:65-96, 1996.
52. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava. Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies. Econometrica, 59(2):479-501, 1991.
53. JohnW. Patty. Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters. Social Choice andWelfare, Forthcoming, 2006.
54. JohnW. Patty. Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2):523-536, 2005.
55. Charles R. Plott. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review, 57:787-806, 1967.
56. Ariel Rubinstein. A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule. Econometrica, 47(2):511-514, 1979.
57. Norman Schofield. Local Political Equilibria. In David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, editors, Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Springer, Heidelberg, 2004.
58. Norman Schofield. Transitivity of Preferences on a Smooth Manifold. Journal of Economic Theory, 14:149-172, 1977.
59. Norman Schofield. Generalized Bargaining Sets for Cooperative Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 7:183-199, 1978.
60. Norman Schofield. The Heart of a Polity. In Norman Schofield, editor, Collective Decisionmaking: Social Choice and Political Economy, pages 183-220. Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston, 1996.
61. Norman Schofield. The Heart and the Uncovered Set. In G. Herden, N. Knoche, C. Seidel, and W. Trockel, editors, The Journal of Economics: Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Supplement 8, pages 79-113. 1999.
62. Norman Schofield and Itai Sened. Modeling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the Political Center So Empty? European Journal of Political Research, 44(3):355-390, 2005.
63. Kenneth A. Shepsle. Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition. Harwood Press, London, 1991.
64. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1):49-74, 1984.
65. Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman. Modeling Negative Campaigning. American Political Science Review, 89(1):49-61, 1995.
66. Alan Ware. Activist-Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties: 'Exchange' Models and Vote-Seeking Behaviour in Parties. British Journal of Political Science, 22(1):71-92, 1992.
67. Stephen Wright and William Riker. Plurality and Runoff Systems and Numbers of Candidates. Public Choice, 60(1):155-175, 1997.