Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 51, Issue 2 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 490-522

  Duggan, John ^a   Fey, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Office motivation; Policy motivation; Probabilistic voting; Spatial model of voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 18644382054     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.006     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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