Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 655-672

  De Sinopoli, Francesco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034370160     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000049     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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