An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 355-383

  Forsythe, Robert ^a   Rietz, Thomas ^a   Myerson, Roger ^b   Weber, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030474193     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02425262     Document Type: Article

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