When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 55-75

  Dhillon, Amrita ^a   Lockwood, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Condorcet winners; Order of elimination; Plurality; Voting games; Weak dominance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347662220     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00050-2     Document Type: Article

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