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Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 99-116

Random matching in the college admissions problem

Author keywords

College admissions problem; Matching; Random mechanism; Stability

Indexed keywords


EID: 38549174205     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0191-6     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (47)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.